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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Defendant was convicted in the District Court for
assault, a class B misdemeanor, possession of controlled
substance, a third degree felony, and possession of handgun
by felon, a third degree felony.

In the course of the

proceeding, he filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied.
He appeals the denial of his Motion to Suppress and his
convictions.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this
appeal under Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The issues in this case for review on appeal are the
following:
1. Whether or not the District Court committed error in
refusing to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress for the
reason that the arrest of Defendant on November 6, 1994, was
unlawful.

The standard of review is the correction of legal

error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
2.

Whether or not the District Court committed error by

refusing to grant Defendants Motion to Suppress because of
the illegality of the seizure by the police of the motor
vehicle in the possession of Defendant at the time of his
arrest on November 6, 1994. The standard of review is the
correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
3.

Whether or not the District Court committed legal

error in refusing to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress
because the inventory search by the police of the motor
vehicle seized from Defendant at the time of his arrest
extended further than was reasonable for an inventory of the
contents of the vehicle.

The standard of review is correction

of a legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
4. Whether or not the District Court committed error in
admitting into evidence the results of the laboratory tests of
the controlled substance found in the vehicle.

The standard of

review is correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774. (Utah Ct. of Appeals).
-2-

5.

Whether or not the District Court committed legal

error in admitting the handgun into evidence.

The standard of

review is the correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
6.

Whether or not the jury verdict adjudging Defendant

guilty of the offense of Assault is supported by sufficient
evidence to overcome a reasonable doubt.

The standard of review

is an-,analysis of the evidence to see if verdict is justified,
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah, 1987).
7.

Whether or not the jury verdict adjudging Defendant

guilty of the offense of Possession of Controlled Substance is
supported by sufficient evidence to overcome a reasonable doubt.
The standard of review is an analysis of the evidence to see if
verdict is justified, State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah, 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
1.

This is a criminal case in which defendant, Gregory

Lee Farrow, was charged by five counts in the Information,
namely:

Count 1, Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony,

occurring on October 10, 1994; Count 2, Assault, a class B
misdemeanor, occurring on October 21, 1994; Assault, a class B
misdemeanor, occurring on April 14, 1994; Count 4, Possession
of Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), a third degree
felony; and Count 5, Possession of Handgun by felon, a third
degree felony, this and Count 4 occurring on November 6, 1994.
2.

A preliminary examination was held in which Count 1,

Aggravated Assault, was dismissed for lack of probable cause,
-3-

but Defendant was held to answer on all of the remaining
charges.

Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking to

suppress evidence of his arrest, the seizure of the motor
vehicle which was in his possession at the time of the arrest,
and the search of the vehicle.
was denied in total.

A hearing was had and the motion

A jury trial was held on the two remaining

class B assaults and the Possession of Controlled Substance
charges, and a verdict of guilty was returned on the assault
occurring on April 14, 1994, and the Possession of Controlled
Substance charge and a verdict of not guilty on the assault
allegedly occurring on October 21, 1994. The remaining charge
of Possession of Handgun by Felon was subsequently tried to
the court and a judgment of guilty was entered.
3.

By reason of the aforementioned convictions, judgment

and sentence were entered by the District Court.
Supporting documents for the foregoing factual statements
are the Bindover Order, Order Denying Motion to Suppress,
Jury Verdict and Judgment, Sentence and Commitment.
II.
1.

Defendant and Angalee Farrow were husband and wife

and they resided in Beaver City, Utah. (Trial Record (T-R)
P. 46). During the month of April, 1994, Defendant was employed
as the manager of Tri-Valley Distributing.

Angalee was pregnant

but she and Defendant were temporarily separated because of
some marital difficulties.

Angalee and Defendant's mother came

to the business where Defendant was employed on April 14, 1994,
as Angalee wished to discuss some matters with Defendant.
An argument ensued, mostly about money, and some minor physical
confrontation took place at the vehicle in which Angalee
-4-

and the mother had arrived.

Angalee testified that Defendant

struck her but Defendant testified that he did not and that the
only physical action that took place between them was each
pulling on a purse to obtain possession of it. The mother did
not see all that went on.
2.

Between April 14, 1994, and October 21, 1994, the baby

was born to Angalee and the parties reconciled and resumed
living together at their apartment in Beaver City, Utah.
However, on or about October 21, 1994, a dispute arose between
them and Angalee moved out and began to reside in Cedar City,
Utah where her parents lived.

She spent some time at Defendants

parents home in Summit, Utah, some time with her parents,
some time in an apartment and finally went to a shelter home.
No confrontations or disputes occurred between Defendant and
Angalee after October 21 when Angalee left the home in Beaver.
3.

On November 5, 1994, Officer Cameron Noel, of the

Beaver City Police Department, received information concerning
some alleged domestic problems between Defendant and his wife
Angalee, and he went to Cedar City and interviewed her.

The

interview centered on three alleged assaults occurring on April
14, 1994, October 10, 1994, and October 21, 1994.

(Preliminary

Examination Record, Pr-Ex-R, P. 21 and Suppression Hearing
Record, Sup-R, P. 8). As to the incident occurring on October
10, 1994, with respect to which the aggravated assault charge
was lodged but dismissed at the preliminary examination
(Pr-Ex-R P. 61) the officer was told by Angalee Farrow in
the interview that Defendant got a pistol in his hand and
threatened to kill himself but he never pointed the gun at
-5-

Angalee or threatened to shoot her.

(Pr Ex-R P. 8

Sup-R P. 14).
4.

On the basis of the interview with Angalee Farrow,

Officer Noel returned to Beaver and informed other officers
that he wanted to have Defendant arrested for assault.
On the evening of November 6, 1994, Deputy Sheriff John B.
Chambers saw Defendant come out of the Beaver Post Office
on Main Street in Beaver City and approach his vehicle,
(Sup-R P.32).

Relying on Officer Noel's request, Officer

Chambers detained Defendant just as Defendant was about to
enter his vehicle,

(Sup-R P. 32). Officer Chambers told

Defendant that he, Defendant, would have to be taken to the
sheriff's office and that defendant's vehicle would be towed
to the sheriff's office,

(Sup-R P. 34). Defendant was formally

arrested upon his arrival at the sheriff's office by Officer
Noel for assault,

(Sup-R P. 22). Defendant protested at

that point and after arriving at the sheriff's office about
having his vehicle towed to the sheriff's office because it
was a rental car and he did not want it taken into custody and
offered to call his assistant manager at the business to come
and take possession of the vehicle, but the police refused
to allow him to provide for the car in that manner and had the
vehicle towed to the sheriff's office over Defendant's objection,
(Sup-R P. 38 and 39). Officer Chambers testified at the suppression hearing that his department has a policy of taking
vehicles into custody whenever they are in the immediate
possession of persons arrested as a protection for the police
agency and for the vehicle although be did'nt specify any danger
to the vehicle in this case had it been turned over to some
-6-

person that Defendant would have designated (Sup-R P. 42).
5.

Officer Chambers and Noel conducted an extensive

"inventory" search of defendants vehicle.

The officer inside

the vehicle found a folder between the two front bucket seats
which had the appearance of a folder for the keeping of an
owners manual, and the officer opened the folder and found
an owners manual and a small package containing what he
identified to be methamphetamine,(Pr Ex-R P. 48). The officers
also found a handgun on the passenger seat of the vehicle,
(Pr Ex-R P. 48). Defendant had been previously convicted of
the commission of a felony.
6.

The supposed methamphetamine was later transported to

Cedar City to a chemistry crime laboratory for testing.

The

substance was left at the laboratory but there was no handto-hand delivery of the substance from the transporting officer
to any other person, (Tr-R P. 173), There was also a period
of time when the vehicle of Defendant's was left on the street
when he was being taken to the sheriff's office and before the
tow truck arrived when it was not under continuous surveillance,
(Tr-R P. 168). Defense counsel objected to the test report of
the substance being received in evidence at the trial as there
having been an inadequate chain of evidence between the time
that Defendant was taken from his vehicle and the time that the
substance was actually received by the lab technician, but the
trial judge overruled the objection, (Tr-R P# 173).
7.

Defendant testified at the trial that he was not a user

of methamphetamine, that the vehicle was a rental car from Las
Vegas, Nevada, and that he had no knowledge of the presence of
the substance in the vehicle, (Tr-R P. 214-253).
-7-

SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I.
ARREST OF DEFENDANT UNLAWFUL.
The arrest of Defendant was not lawful because the officer
did not have reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor had
been committed in the officer!s presence or that a felony had
been committed by Defendant.

The officer was not responding

to a domestic violence call as anticipated by statute because
the arrest of Defendant was too remote in time and place from
any domestic problem actual or known to the officer.
II.
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE UNLAWFUL.
The seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful because
the vehicle had no relevance to the cause for the arrest and
Defendant was able and desirous of providing for the safe
keeping of the vehicle otherwise thereby relieving the police
from all risk of liability.
III.
SEARCH OF VEHICLE WAS UNREASONABLE AND EXCESSIVE.
Even if the seizure of the vehicle was lawful, the
inventory of the contents of the vehicle process was unreasonable and excessive in that it went so far as to open the
owners manual cover.
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IV.
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE LABORATORY REPORT ON THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNLAWFUL.
The admission into evidence of the laboratory report
on the testing of the controlled substance was unlawful
because there was not continuous survailance of Defendant's
vehicle between the time of his arrest and the time of the
inventory of the vehicle and because there was not an unbroken
chain of evidence of the possession of the controlled substance
between the inventory of the vehicle and the testing by the
technition at the laboratory.
V.
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF HANDGUN UNLAWFUL.
The admission into evidence of the handgun found in
Defendant's vehicle was unlawful because there was not continuous
survailance of Defendant's vehicle between the time of his
arrest and the time of the inventory of the vehicle.
VI.
CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
The jury verdict of assault should be set aside as not being
supported by the evidence.
VII.
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AGAINST WEIGHT
OF EVIDENCE.
The jury verdict of possession of controlled substance should
be set aside as not being supported by the evidence.

In view of

Defendants testimony, there was clearly a reasonable doubt.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I.
ARREST OF DEFENDANT UNLAWFUL.
The record does not disclose the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Defendant, so the arrest must be sustained,
if at all, as a warrantless arrest.
for the arrest was assault.

The claimed justification

(Sup-R P. 22). There are only

two possible statutory bases that deserve analysis:
(1)

Section 77-7-2, UCA, 1953, quoted in the Addendum,

impowers peace officers to affect a warrantless arrest under
certain circumstances.

Sub-Section (1) does not apply as the

record does not disclose the commission of any misdemeanor
in the officer's presence.

Sub-Section (2) would apply only

if the officer had reasonable cause to believe that a felony
had been committed and that defendant had committed it. The
felony apparently relied on was the alleged aggravated assault
occurring on October 10, 1994, (which was dismissed at the preliminary examination for lack of probable cause) and the only
evidence of that which the officer had was obtained from his
interview with Angelee Farrow on

November 5, 1994, and that

evidence, as testified to by Officer Noel at the suppression
hearing, was to the effect that Defendant threatened to use
the gun on himself but did not threaten Angelee Farrow with
the gun in any manner.

(Sup-R P. 14).

Sub-Section (3)

has no application because there was no evidence that Defendant
was attempting to flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest, or
that he was going to destroy or conceal evidence, or that he
-10-

was about to injure any person or damage any property belonging
to another.

He was just stopping his vehicle on Main Street

to get his mail.

(Sup-R P. 32). The record does not disclose

any contact by Defendant with his wife since October 21, 1994,
with the alleged aggravated assault occurring on October 10,
1994, and the arrest was made on November 6, 1994.

(Sup-R

P. 22).
(2)

Section 77-36-2, UCA, 1953, quoted in the Addendum,

provides officers with additional warrantless arrest powers by
Sub-Section (3) in domestic violence cases, but the clear
intent of the statute, as indicated by Sub-Sections (2) and
(3), is to provide a remedy for immediate and urgent situations
involving domestic violence.

However, Section 77-36-3 is not

intended to be a substitute for the general arrest powers
contained in Section 77-7-2 in cases arising out of domestic
violence but not needing urgent attention.

In the instant case,

at least 16 days had elapsed since the last contact between
the parties so far as the record indicates and there had been
more than ample time to procure an arrest warrant.

Indeed,

in view of the continued presence of Defendant in the small
community and the fact that the alleged victim was residing in
a shelter for safety in Cedar City, Utah, more than 50 miles
away, there was ample time to obtain an arrest warrant after
the interview with the alleged victim on November 5, 1994.
In view of the foregoing, the arrest of Defendant should
have been suppressed by reason of the hearing on the Motion to
Suppress, as well as all evidence obtained as a result of the
unlawful arrest.
-11-

II.
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE UNLAWFUL.
Even if the arrest of Defendant was lawful, the officer
had no right to seize his vehicle under the circumstances of
this case.

The officer testified at the hearing on the Motion

to Suppress that the reason for the policy of taking vehicles
into custody that had been in the possession of a person
arrested is to protect the vehicle from damage in being left
unattended thereby eliminating liability to the police and
loss to the owner of the vehicle.

(Sup-R P. 42). It is

conceeded that such a policy has merit where the arrest is
made in certain districts of large cities or when there is
otherwise risk in leaving a vehicle unattended.

The liability

of the police is rooted in the fact that they are taking the
arrested person away from his vehicle and thereby creating a
risk of loss to him.

In the instant case, Defendant desired

and urged to assume his own responsibility and also the
responsibility of the police by delivering the vehicle over to
a reliable person and thereby avoid the lack of accessability
to his business of the vehicle and the fees involved in the
impoundment.

(Sup-R P. 42). As the arrest was for assault,

the vehicle had no relevance and the police did not claim
that it had any evidenciary value.

The objective of the

police, especially where they searched even to the extent of
looking into an owners manual, was an obvious pretext for an
opportunity to search the vehicle but not to protect it.

-12-

III.
INVENTORY OF VEHICLE UNREASONABLE AND EXCESSIVE.
Even if the seizure of the vehicle was lawful and necessary
for its protection, the inventory of the contents, which the
officer insisted upon calling it rather than a "search",
(Sup-R P% 42). extended beyond what was necessary to itemize
the contents for the protection of the police.

The list

could have included an "owners manual" rather than whatever
might have been inside the cover.

The "inventory" was an

obvious pretext search, and one might wonder how far the
"inventory" would have gone had the officers not found what they
were looking for in the manual.

One whose vehicle is taken

from him upon his arrest is entitled to have the property handled
with a view of protecting his privacy rather than to exploit
his belongings to the world.

While the vehicle was found to

contain a prohibited substance, the officers had no right to
violate Defendant's constitutional right of privacy in order
to locate something which the officers no doubt had a hunch
was present.
IV.
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF LABORATORY TEST RESULTS OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNLAWFUL.
At the trial, evidence was offered as to the test results
on the examination by the chemist of the substance seized from
Defendant's vehicle in the course of the "inventory".

The

officer testified that he transported the substance to the
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laboratory in Cedar City, Utah, for analysis where he placed
it in a locker to be presumably obtained by the chemist who
would perform the test.

(Tr-R P. 112). The evidence was

incomplete and insufficient as to the laboratory's procedure,
in any, to control the access to the locker.

The trial judge

stated in the presence of the jury that he believed the
procedure to be adequate but his belief was apparently from
sources outside the trial record which the defense had no
opportunity to evaluate.

(Tr-R P. 173). The defense objection

to admitting the test result should have been sustained and
the evidence rejected.

An additional reason for rejecting the

test result is that there was a period of time between the
time that Defendant was arrested and taken from his vehicle
and the time of the "inventory" when the vehicle was not under
continuous surveillance thereby allowing an opportunity for
some other person to place the substance into the vehicle.
(Tr-R P. 168).
V.
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF HANDGUN UNLAWFUL.
Evidence was presented at the subsequent portion of the
trial to the court without a jury, (the trial was bifurcated
in order to avoid the prejudicial effect of having the jury
learn that Defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony), that a handgun had been located in Defendant's vehicle
in connection with the inventory, together with evidence that
Defendant had been previously convicted of a felony prior to
his arrest in the instant case.

-14-

By reason of the lack of

continuous surveillance of the vehicle as set forth in the
preceeding Point ,TIVTf of this argument, the handgun evidence
should have been excluded.

Because of the exclusion of the

handgun evidence, the evidence of the former conviction of
a felony would have been irrelevant and should also have been
excluded.

-15-

VI.
CONVICTION OF ASSAULT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
The jury!s verdict of guilty of assault, a class B
Tnisdemeanor, occurring on April 14, 1994, is not supported by
sufficient evidence to overcome Defendant's presumption of
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although Angelee Farrow

testified that Defendant struck her, Defendant testified with
equal believability that he did not strike her which should
have left a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as
to his guilt.

The anxiety and confusion surrounding the

incident would have clouded her impressions as much as his.
(Tr-R P. 50).
VII.
CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AGAINST
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
One of the essential elements of the offense of possession of controlled substance is that it be had
intentionally".

T!

knowingly and

(Section 58-37-8).

Defendant testified that the vehicle was a rental car
from Las Vegas, Nevada, and that he had not had occasion to
look into the

owners manual and that he was not aware of the

presence of the controlled substance.
evidence on the point.

The State had no

(Tr-R P.214-25^In view of the lack of

evidence to the contrary, the jury had no basis for finding
against Defendant's testimony.

The jury was in error in

assuming, without evidence, that the mere presence in an
unobvious place in the vehicle of the substance should not
overcome the reasonable doubt created by his testimony.
-16-

CONCLUSION
1.

The ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS entered by the

District Court should be vacated, and the evidence of the
arrest of Defendant, together with all evidence resulting from
his arrest, should be suppressed.
2.

The evidence obtained by reason of the seizure,

search and inventory of the contents of Defendant's vehicle
should be suppressed, even if the evidence of the arrest of
Defendant is not suppressed.
3.

The evidence of the

result of the test by the

chemist of the substance seized from Defendant's vehicle
should be ruled as inadmissible and suppressed.
4.

The evidence of the handgun found in Defendant's

vehicle and the evidence of his having been previously
convicted of a felony should be ruled inadmissible and suppressed.
5.

The conviction of Defendant for assault, a class B

misdemeanor, should be set aside.
6.

The conviction of Defendant for possession of controlled

substance, a third degree felony, should be set aside.
7.

The conviction of Defendant for possession of handgun

by felon, a third degree felony, should be set aside.
Dated November 13, 1995.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, S 77-7-2 (1953, as amended) copy attached.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, i 77-36-2 (1953, as amended) copy attached
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, copy attached.
Order admitting sample of controlled substance (Exhibit 1)
into evidence.

Jury trial record P. 173-175.

JURY VERDICT.
Order finding Defendant guilty.
April 20, 1995, P. 16.
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Record of hearing held

Bf

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Etion
J-M6.
-7-17.

1W9.

I

•7-22.
?7-23.

Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon — Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to take possession of
weapons.
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge.
Appearance required by citation — Arrest for
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and
costs.
Service of citation on defendant — Filing in court
— Contents of citations.
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of
bail — Parent signature required — Information, when required.
Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to
magistrate — Transfer to court with jurisdiction — Violation as misdemeanor.

B-7'l. "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed.
|An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or
pmission to custody. The person shall not be subjected to
wj more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and
pention.
1980
Bj«2. By peace officers.
B peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
grrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of
the physical senses or any device that enhances the
acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
^ause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
1986
J-7-3. By private p e r s o n s .
I private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his
^presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has comL mitted it.
1980
f-7-4. Magistrate m a y orally order arrest.
|A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest
'one committing or attempting to commit a public offense in
j presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emerwhen probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally
horize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense,
I thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be
i against the person arrested.
1980

Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests
may be made — Contents of warrant — Responsibility for transporting prisoners —
Court clerk to dispense restitution for transportation.
|(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon
lading probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
IHU committed a public offense. If the offense charged is:

77-7-6

(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at
any time of the day or night; or
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be
made at night only if:
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do
so on the warrant;
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public
highway, in a public place, or in a place open to or
accessible to the public; or
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a
peace officer in the regular course of that peace
officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated
to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest.
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must
appear in court, the magistrate shall include in the arrest
warrant the name of the law enforcement agency in the
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the
magistrate under Subsection (a) is responsible for
providing inter-county transportation of the defendant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforcement agency to the court site.
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the
warrant may contract with another law enforcement
agency to have a defendant transported.
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the
magistrate under Subsection (a) as responsible for
transporting the defendant shall provide to the court
clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an
affidavit stating t h a t the defendant was transported,
indicating the law enforcement agency responsible
for the transportation, and stating the number of
miles the defendant was transported.
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution
paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental transportation expenses and dispense restitution monies
collected by the court to the law enforcement agency
responsible for the transportation of a convicted defendant.
1993
77-7-5.5.

Repealed.

1991

77-7-6. Manner of m a k i n g arrest.
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person
being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest
him. Such notice shall not be required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger
the life or safety of the officer or another person or will
likely enable the party being arrested to escape;
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately
after the commission of an offense or an escape.
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a
criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting
officer shall assess the communicative abilities of the
hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification,
and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accurately and effectively communicates with the hearingimpaired person including qualified interpreters, lip
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with
print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for
the deaf.
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be
considered by any court when evaluating whether statements of a hearing-impaired person were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
1995
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g state Renunciation of this combe by the same authority which exesending a six-month notice in writing
ion to withdraw from the compact to
tes party hereto
1980
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BEFANT ABUSE P R O C E D U R E S ACT
Definitions
Law enforcement officers' training,
duties, and powers — Reports —
Records
Court's powers and duties m domestic
violence actions — Order restraining defendant — Penalty for violation
Conditions for release after arrest for
domestic violence
Repealed
Appearance of defendant required —
Determinations by court
Sentencing — Restricting contact
with victim — Counseling — Cost
assessed against defendant
Enforcement of orders restricting contact with victim
Prosecutor to notify victim of decision
as to prosecution
Peace officers' immunity from liability
Separability clause
Definitions.
p n this chapter
^Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in

rabo-6-i

HEDomestic violence" includes any of the folHPcrimes when committed by one cohabitant
B|fc another
HuO assault, as described in Section 76n b ) aggravated assault, as described in
Rction 76-5-103,
•Re) mayhem, as described in Section 76Bfd) criminal mischief, as described in SecEcm 76-6-106,
R e ) burglary, as described in Section 76B(f) aggravated burglary, as described in
Kction 76-6-203,
mjg) criminal trespass, as described in SecEon 76-6-206,
m(h) aggravated kidnapping, as described
E*cSection 76-5-302,
K(i) unlawful detention, as described in SecEon 76-5-304, or
B£(j) sexual offenses, as described in Title
B6, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Title 76, Chapter
KErVictim" means a cohabitant who has been
|ected to domestic violence
1993

77-36-3

L a w e n f o r c e m e n t officers , t r a i n i n g , duties, a n d p o w e r s — R e p o r t s —
Records.
(1) All training relating to the handling of domestic violence complaints by law enforcement officers
shall stress protection of the victim, enforcement of
criminal laws in domestic situations, and availability
of community resources Law enforcement agencies
and community organizations with expertise in domestic violence shall cooperate in all aspects of that
training
(2) The primary duty of peace officers responding
to a domestic violence call is to protect the parties
and enforce the laws allegedly violated
(3) (a) In addition to the arrest powers described in
Section 77-7-2, when a peace officer responds to a
domestic violence call and has probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed, the
peace officer shall arrest without a warrant or
issue a citation to any person that he has probable cause to believe has committed any of the
offenses described in Subsections 77-36-l(2)(a)
through (I)
If the peace officer has probable cause to believe that there will be continued violence
against the alleged victim, or if there is evidence
that the perpetrator has either recently caused
serious bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon
in the domestic violence offense, the officer shall
arrest and take the alleged perpetrator into custody, and may not utilize the option of issuing a
citation under this section For purposes of this
section "serious bodily injur}" and "dangerous
weapon" mean the same as those terms are defined in Section 76-1-601
(b) If a peace officer does not immediately exercise arrest powers or initiate criminal proceedings by citation or otherwise, he shall notify the
victim of his or her right to initiate a criminal
proceeding and of the importance of preserving
evidence
(c) A peace officer responding to a domestic violence call shall prepare an incident report including an officer's disposition of the case That
report shall be made available to the victim,
upon request, at no cost
(4) The peace officer shall offer, arrange, or facilitate transportation for the victim to a hospital for
treatment of injuries, or to a place of safety or shelter
(5) The law enforcement agency shall forward the
incident report to the appropriate prosecutor within
ten days of making the report, unless the case is under active investigation
(6) Each law enforcement agency shall, as soon as
practicable, make a written record and maintain
records of all incidents of domestic violence reported
to it
(7) Records made and kept pursuant to Subsections
(3) and (6) shall be identified by a law enforcement
agency code for domestic violence
1991

77-36-2.

77-36-3.

C o u r t s p o w e r s a n d d u t i e s in d o m e s t i c
violence a c t i o n s — O r d e r r e s t r a i n i n g
d e f e n d a n t — P e n a l t y for violation.
(1) Because of the serious nature of domestic violence, the court, m domestic violence actions
(a) may not dismiss any charge or delay disposition because of concurrent divorce or other civil
proceedings,
(b) may not require proof that either party is
seeking a dissolution of marriage before instigation of criminal proceedings,

-?o-

^uam
John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0, Box 1468
Beaver, Utah 84713
Tel. 801-438-5412
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THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 94-CR-90

GREGORY LEE FARROW,
Defendant

Defendant having filed in this action his Motion to Suppress
Evidence

arising from the arrest of Defendant, the seizure of the

motor vehicle which was in his possession at the time of the arrest,
and the inventorying of the contents of said vehicle, all occurring
on November 6, 1994, and the suppression of all evidence obtained by
reason of such arrest, seizure and inventorying, and said Motion having
come on for hearing before the court on the 9th

day of March,

1995, the State being represented by Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County
Attorney, and the Defendant being present and represented by his
assigned legal counsle, John 0. Christiansen, and said arrest,
seizure and inventorying having been done without a warrant, and
the State having presented evidence and legal argument against the
granting of said Motion and Defendant having presented legal
argument in favor of said Motion and the court having duly considered
the same, and it appearing:
1.

That the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe

a felony had been committed and had reasonable cause to believe
that the Defendant had committed it;
2.

That the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe
-21-

that the Defendant had committed a public offense, and there was
reasonable cause for believing that the Defendant may have fled to
avoid arrestybr may injure another person; and
3,

That there was an ongoing threat of domestic violence by

Defendant against his spouse, Angelee Farrow:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

That said Motion to suppress should

be and is hereby denied.

Dated J- & ~

Robert"T. Braithvaite'**
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Leo G. Kanell,
Beaver County Attorney,
Attorney for State

C

K ^ 1 A & ^ H&x*.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing AppellantTs
Appeal Brief upon the Plaintiff/Respondent by mailing two
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to the Attorney for the
Plaintiff/Respondent on the 16th day of November, 1995, addressed
as follows: Ms. Jan Graham, Attorney General, State of Utah,
236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
P.O. Box 1468
Beaver, Utah 84713

